COMPREHENSIVE ACTION:

A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT SOLOUTION TO FIGHTING

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

BY

JOHN E. BAQUET

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major John E. Baquet, ███████████████████████████████.
Following graduation from Angelo State University in 1996, he earned
the Master of Aeronautical Science degree in Aviation Management from
Embry-Riddle University. Major Baquet is a senior logistician and
military parachutist having spent a significant part of his career working
with other USG government agencies and special operations forces.
Additionally, he was an instructor at Texas A&M University where he
taught the senior capstone class in National Security Policy. Maj
Baquet's short career has taken him to six continents and many
operational deployments to include Operations IRAQI/ ENDURING
FREEDOM, NOBLE EAGLE, JOINT GUARD, INDY, DESERT THUNDER,
DESERT FOX and numerous operational exercises. Major Baquet is a
graduate of US Air Force Squadron Officer School, US Army Command
and General Staff College, and US Air Force School of Advanced Air and
Space Studies, where this paper was developed. Major Baquet is a
squadron commander at the 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon AFB
New Mexico.

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ABSTRACT

This study explains a better way for the US government (USG) to organize to fight terrorism. Any strategic or operational success in a long war on terrorism depends on a campaign coordinated with, and complementary to, symbiotic efforts within the Department of Defense (DoD) and across the other government agencies. Only through global interagency unity of command and unity of effort will the USG provide a holistic solution to defend against terrorism. Current USG agencies lack the ability to exercise unity of command and unity of effort. Cultural barriers prevent departments and agencies from working synergistically and a lack of common planning perspectives and doctrine further exacerbate government dysfunctionality. Additionally, the process does not provide incentives nor prepares participants to work with other agencies or departments. Power, position, influence, and survival instincts all drive government agencies toward inefficient and sometimes irrational behavior. Finally, decisions and negotiations made at the time government agencies were formed influence the current system that persist today.

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Introduction

Background

President Dwight Eisenhower outlined his proposal for defense reorganization in 1958. Concerned about unity of command at the highest levels, he focused on unified commands, multi-service combatant structures that divide responsibilities among theaters around the world. Based on his experience in directing complex military operations, Eisenhower thought it unrealistic that the United States could institute a perfect system to address all its security requirements. However, he insisted on a command plan that remained true to the doctrine of unity, clarifying the authority of commanders in chief (CINCs) of unified commands over individual service component commanders and by the President and Secretary of Defense over CINCs.[1]

For over two decades, from his initial assignment in the War Department to his election as President, Eisenhower consistently supported measures to force different parts of the military to work together to support one strategy. "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever," he recorded in his 1958 proposal. "If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it . . . with all services, as one

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1. Vernon E. Davis, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Organizational Development, vol. 1, Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, DC.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), xi.

single concentrated effort."[2] Jointness, he argued, was the key to achieving unity of effort.

Unity of effort became crucial following the events of September 11, 2001. Like World War II, the United States' was again thrust into a global war. This time the United States entered a global war on terrorism. President Eisenhower's lessons remain salient as unity of effort became ever more important. Military forces jumped into action against this adversary not only in Afghanistan but also throughout the world. The new threat from this unconventional form of warfare has again forced a change in the way the US organizes to fight its wars. As World War II required a joint military effort, the GWOT requires a focused interagency effort.

Today's national security apparatus, charged with strategic planning and execution, is the result of the National Security Act of 1947. Notwithstanding efforts in the mid-80s with the Goldwater-Nichols Act that primarily focused on the national military establishment, the current national security apparatus is unchanged since its creation following World War II. To deal with the 21stcentury challenges, the United States requires a national security apparatus that delivers a collective approach to unity of command and unity of effort.

A fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and the national security structure, and the lack of

2. Alice C. Cole, *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978* (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, Historical Office, 1978), 175.

national-level joint interagency organizations undermines the ability of the United States to develop appropriate policies and implement comprehensive strategies. At a time when threats and problems are merging to develop deep, long-lasting challenges to national security, America clings to an archaic and stove-piped decision making process that makes national policy difficult to develop and even more difficult to implement.

The initial selection of the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead federal agency for the GWOT is the source of an imbalance in the application of national power. In particular, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was assigned as the lead agent in the new GWOT.[3] Since USSOCOM was assigned lead agent amongst all other USG agencies, this placed unique organizational challenges on DoD and other USG departments as one instrument of power became the lead for the rest. The challenges this decision caused require the USG to counter bureaucratic effects in order to establish detailed coordination and synchronization of activities both overseas and at home.

American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the need for a comprehensive and integrated strategy to achieve longer-term national goals. The USG must adopt a better way to combine all the elements of national power. Any strategic or operational success in a long war on terrorism depends on a campaign coordinated with and

3. George Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,* (Washington, DC: White House, 2006), 7.

complementary to efforts across the Department of Defense and the other government departments. Only through global interagency unity of command will the effort provide "the persistent accumulation of successes—"some seen, some unseen".[4]

Unity of Command

Unity of command is a critical principle for USG agencies to counter transnational threats. Unity of command involves imparting authority in an individual to direct all elements of national power to defeat Al Qaeda, which possesses an elasticity of command and adaptability, that have long challenged those who seek to define, analyze, or defeat the group. The USG must exploit our enemy's elasticity instead of operating in a fragmented way like Al Qaeda and other extremist groups. Our USG agencies and department leadership must have a singular strategy to accomplish specified missions.[5]

A critical component in establishing unity of command is clearly defining the chain of command. The chain of command must be concise, avoiding unnecessary, confused, and cumbersome decision layers. Unity of command should also clearly delineate those directly in the chain of command and those with advisory positions. Finally, clearly defining advisory positions mitigates lowest common denominator decisions that

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4. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 71.
5. Murdock, Clark A. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 63-67.

dominate consensus based decision-making and sustains distinct agency culture and inputs into government agencies.[6]

Along with a clear chain of command, individual accountability is a second critical hallmark of unity of command. Individual accountability involves the clear understanding that those tasked to lead will be applauded for mission success or blamed for mission failure.[7] It must be accompanied with the resources required to accomplish the mission, clarity in desired objectives, and freedom to organize and apply resources to objectives. Instilling accountability requires placing qualified leaders in their positions with the full backing, support, and trust of national leadership. It also requires a structure and culture where subordinate leaders and organizations recognize the appointed leader's authority and understand that the leader also holds them accountable for actions.

Unity of Effort

Closely related to unity of command is unity of effort. Unity of effort forges critical links between each of the elements of national power and serves as the mechanism allowing interagency partners to focus on the task versus organizational interests. It also seals seams between elements of national power and provides transparent transition between them. Unity of effort is critical in an era of diverse challenges that require the capabilities of all branches of government to effectively

6. William Cohen, *The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century*, (Washington DC, 2001), 14
7. Michele Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Phase II Report*, with Clark Murdock, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, July 2005), 3.

execute policies underpinning US national security. An accurate assessment of Al Qaeda must begin with the recognition that it has become several things at once: an organization, a network, a movement or ideology, and a global brand. It takes a holistic USG approach to counter this kind of threat. The Hart-Rudman commission stated, unity of effort must operate "with one overriding purpose in mind: to permit the U.S. government to integrate more effectively the many diverse strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a new era--not only the traditional agenda of defense, diplomacy, and intelligence, but also economics, counter-terrorism, combating organized crime, protecting the environment, fighting pandemic diseases, and promoting human rights worldwide." [8] The goal is a USG where efforts are integrated, coordinated, and synchronized across all elements of national power to accomplish required missions.

Inherently, unity of effort provides cohesive direction over elements of national power. Operational control bolsters the capabilities of all USG agencies through integrated action. Imparting operational control entails providing the capacity to direct all aspects of interagency operations necessary to accomplish missions. Key elements of operational control include organizing and employing capabilities, developing objectives supporting mission accomplishment, and assigning tasks to subordinate organizations. Exercising operational control

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8. Cohen, *United States Commission on National Security*, 47

assures that all USG agencies act within their capability and focus of employing core competencies as a part of a whole of government strategy.[9] Operational control is limited, pertains only to tasks directly related to the mission, and does not include areas under the direct purview[10] of various agencies or departments.[11] However, any effort to restrict operational control should be limited and only for specific reasons.

This paper will first examine the seams between bureaucratic organizations using Graham Allison's models from his book Essence of Decision. His models explain forces at work in organizations while illuminating why government agencies are unable to apply all the elements of national power--organizational structure and bureaucratic seams inhibit holistic strategy. Allison's work is descriptive versus prescriptive. His models indicate why bureaucracies, such USG agencies, operate as they do.

This paper makes the case for a holistic approach to USG structure and culture to counter transnational threats. Building on the work of Goldwater-Nichols, integration is achieved by putting organizational structures in place that require the various institutional departments to come together for joint planning and program execution. Three options are considered to mandate major structural and cultural

9. Donald Hurley and Scott Moore, *Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore,* (Parameters, Winter 1998), 99-112.
10. Examples of areas not subsumed under operational control include administration, manning, training, and internal organization.
11. DoD Dictionary http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary

changes to streamline the decision-making hierarchy and establish new methods and organizations that develop policy options, implement strategies, and integrate Government actions. Finally, each option is evaluated through the lenses of unity of effort, unity of command, and cultural barriers.

Chapter 1

The Case for Whole of Government Solutions

Today's combat environments, often with a significant nation-building component, are replete with organizations besides the military. Unfortunately, our governmental structure has not changed with today's threats to our nation. One agency, such as DoD, should not be responsible for integrating the efforts of all the others as departmental strategies differ. For example, in early 2003, dissatisfaction surfaced within the Bush administration over the management of the Iraq reconstruction effort. At that time, the President shifted the lead agency responsibility for reconstruction in Iraq from DoS and USAID to DoD, despite protests from DoS. The conflict was a struggle for relevance amongst two departments: establishing security on the part of DoD, and reconstruction on the part of DoS. The solution was to make DoD the lead in both security and reconstruction, in hopes that DoD's culture of reducing uncertainty and responding rapidly would make up for its lack of institutional understanding of reconstruction—something that worked to the detriment of U.S. involvement in Iraq in 2004 and 2005.

At the national level, integration of strategy is supposed to occur from within the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC advises the President, decisions are made, and the instruments of power are integrated toward one strategy to forward our national interests. In fact,

the National Security Strategy (NSS) says, "the aim of strategy is help make the world not just safer, but better."[12] The current methodology of identifying broad strategic goals and relegating specific policy prescriptions to more narrowly focused documents allows the development of coherent implementation efforts based on each department's core mission but does not link agency strategies.

The linkage of strategies is critical and complicated. "The strengths of some strategies are useful in suggesting ways to enhance the value of other strategies, fill in gaps, speed implementation, guide resource allocations, and provide oversight opportunities."[13] A DoD solution may be independently effective, but should be nested with a larger unified strategy bringing together all USG departments.

Allison's Organizational Behavior Model

Harvard Professor Graham Allison's organizational behavior models explain forces at work in bureaucracies and shed light on why government agencies are unable to apply all the elements of national power. In his work, "Essence of Decision," Allison studied the events of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis to develop three different conceptual models--Rational Policy Model (Model 1), Organizational

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12. George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C: The White House, 2002), 1.
13. Randall A. Yim, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,* (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), 1.

Process Model (Model II), and Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III).[14] His

models indicate why bureaucracies, such as those at NSC, DoS, and

DoD, operate as they do but the models do not provide a solution for

bureaucratic problems.[15]

Of the three models Allison outlines, the two most useful are the

Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Models. The

Organizational Process model suggests that organizations place high

value on routine and procedure to mitigate paralysis and minimize

uncertainty. This model views organizational output primarily based on

adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) built from

experience. Additionally, the model considers longevity, positional

power, and turf as key components for success in the organization.

Given a familiar set of circumstances, the Organizational Process model

suggests standard responses produce optimal results. However, when

faced with unfamiliar situations, sub-optimal or irrational results occur

as organizations attempt to apply inappropriate SOPs rather than

considering better alternatives. The Organizational Process model

explains the benefit and cost of SOPs. The benefit is that disciplined

procedures produce known results. The cost is rejection of innovative

solutions when trying to apply SOPs to inappropriate situations.

Unlike the Organizational Process Model, the Bureaucratic Politics

Model explains sub-optimal and sometimes irrational performance

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14. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,* (Longman Press, 1999), 4-5
15. Kathleen M. Conley, *Campaigning for Change,* (Airpower Journal, Fall 1998), 54-70.

differently. The model regards organizational output largely based on bureaucratic bargaining between actors with various interests, perceptions, levels of power, and position. The underlying assumption is "that many actors influence decisions through a dynamic bargaining process shaped by myriad factors."[16] In this environment access and trust serve as the base for power. Sub-optimal output occurs when actors with the most influence skew the bureaucratic process, in this case non-DoD agencies. These influential actors may or may not be the leader of the organization. Therefore, choices result from give and take at crucial decision points and not as the result of careful study or a senior leader's preference.[17]

The Bureaucratic Politics Model explains how a government organization's origin and development influences its effectiveness. Sub-optimal performance is a factor leading up to the initial design and evolution of the organization. During the initial design of key national security agencies (i.e., JCS, CIA, etc.), political conflict and compromise among key stakeholders dominate the process. Additionally, the force driving the new organization is not a pressing international concern or congressional mandate but rather a push from the executive branch. Congress plays a role, albeit secondary.[18] Congressional oversight is strong in theory but in reality is sporadic and ineffective due in large part

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16. Vicki J. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia*, (Air University Press, 2004), 85-86.

17. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide*, 85-86

18. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide*, 39

to lack of electoral incentive and an unwillingness to expend political capital. The result is an agency that is formed from bureaucratic bargaining, that reflects the incentives, interests and political compromise of those involved in the creation process, and that may not serve the national interest or its intended purpose.

Once codified, agency evolution is driven by three factors. First, structural choices and compromises made at the time of the agencies inception determine its evolutionary path. Most often a reflection of the current political environment, structural choices codified in law imprint organizational "birthmarks." The rigor of the codification process also provides an enduring quality to the initial birthmarks.[19] For example, with passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the impact of the decision to include the Joint Chiefs in the decision chain caused degradation in civilian control that lasted almost 40 years. The problem was not recognized and corrected until Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

While statutes codify major aspects of agencies, statutes do not determine all agency attributes. Thus the second factor, bureaucratic interests, serves as an additional evolutionary pressure point. The ebb and flow of interest groups and changes in their alignment over time

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19. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide*, 42

causes agencies to change. Much of this evolutionary force is the responsibility of the executive branch.[20]

Finally, recent events provide a third factor affecting agency evolution. "Domestic and international political developments serve as external shocks that can entrench an agency in its current developmental path or...shift it to a new one."[21] For example, the attacks of September 11, 2001 served as a major impetus for both the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Director for National Intelligence.

Analyzing bureaucratic seams through the lens of Allison's models provides useful insights. The goal of developing interagency partnerships is difficult to achieve because of various factors designed to protect the status quo. USG agencies do not act as a unitary force with the singular goal of executing policy optimally. Rather, they operate in a process biased toward a tug-of-war between competing bureaucratic interests. For example, the tensions between the US ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, and the commander of NATO forces, General Stanley McChrystal, characterize the frictional relationship between DoS and DoD. Eikenberry and McChrystal have had significant disagreements over the course of the Afghanistan war and struggled to align their visions for how to work with the Afghan government. Ambassador Eikenberry believes DoS's views were not getting adequate attention.

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20. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide*, 39
21. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide*, 43

Eikenberry believed the DoD was the sole voice in determining what was wrong in Afghanistan. Likewise, he believed the DoD would be the sole voice in determining what to do about it.[22] Eikenberry warned that McChrystal's request for additional troops might be counterproductive to DoS's efforts in the region. The ambassador refused to release funds to expand a military effort to turn villagers into armed guards. He opposed one Army brigade's plan to form an anti-Taliban alliance with a Pashtun tribe and funnel it development money. Additionally, he criticized the military's proposal to buy generators and diesel fuel for the energy-starved city of Kandahar and supported a longer-term hydroelectric dam project.[23] Ultimately, the President approved McChrystal's request for additional troops counter to Eikenberry's wishes.

While success requires participants to lay aside differences, this runs counter to an agency's survival interests. Working toward a common good disrupts standard operating procedures, requires surrendering turf, and adds uncertainty--all a high price to pay for a vague return. Additionally, in a process where job security is based on agency performance, little incentive exists to cooperate. Countering bureaucratic effects requires considerable energy. As seen with Eikenberry and McChrystal, any hope of achieving substantive improvement in the bureaucratic process, other than changes to

22. Joshua Partlow, *Obama's War, (*Washington Post, May 9, 2010)
23. Parlow, *Obama's War*

personnel, requires the full weight of the President, early buy-in from bureaucratic interest groups, and advocacy from key leaders.

In line with Allison's Models, the best approach to non-DoD planning is an approach that broadly encompasses the elements of national power. Colin S. Gray argues in that "a cardinal virtue of strategic theory, reasoning, or planning is that it brings together, it connects, activities which otherwise easily could be treated as though they were autonomous realms."[24] Lack of common doctrine and cultural barriers prevent departments and agencies from working synergistically, hindering unity of command and unity of effort.

First, the transnational threats facing the United States and its allies go beyond traditional law enforcement, military, and intelligence functional boundaries. Second, rather than attempting to attack transnational terrorism, WMD proliferation, drug trafficking, and a myriad of other transnational threats with distinct strategies, bureaucracies, and programs, the United States needs a more sophisticated strategy, namely, the creation of organizations to synchronize global efforts to protect our nation.

Improved coordination alone will not lead to an effective strategy to fight transnational terrorism. Coordination, even when it is successful, still may result in a fragmented, sub-optimized strategy that fails to

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24. Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy,* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 6.

integrate the various elements of national power.[25] The Hart-Rudman commission identified this problem and called for a redesign of government to allow "the US government to integrate more effectively the many diverse strands of policy that underpin US national security in a new era."[26] David Tucker has similarly noted that the response to terrorism "requires some degree of integration of the heterogeneous skills, principles, and standard operating procedures that make up the US government."[27] Additionally, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has spoken of the need to integrate military activities more effectively with those of the civilian departments and agencies to fight our adversaries more effectively.[28]

There is a limit to resources the US will commit to the global war on terrorism. Long-term structural US budget deficits make it nearly certain that vast new sources of funding will not materialize. The overall costs of the current counter-terrorism campaign are already in excess of

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25. Former US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Commander General Anthony Zinni has stated that, despite improvements in interagency coordination, "agencies still tend to plan in isolation from one another, and then meet on the field on game day working off of different playbooks." He called for formalized interagency planning based on integrated monitoring and assessments, and more attention for conflict prevention activities. See General Anthony Zinni and William J. Garvelink, *Civil-Military Cooperation in a Time of Turmoil*, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/041207 (accessed February, 2010).
26*. Hart-Rudman Report*, *The Phase III Report of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century* (The "Hart-Rudman Report, 2001), 47
27. David Tucker, *The Terrorism Threat and US Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors*, (USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2004), 140-141.
28. For example, General Peter Pace, then Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Remarks delivered to the "Marine Corps Association/Naval Institute's Forum 2004," Gen Pace promoted the idea of a "Goldwater-Nichols" style reform to promote more effective interagency cooperation. www.dtic.mil/jcs/vice_chairman/MCANavalInstitute (accessed February 8, 2010).

$1.08 trillion and are almost certainly not sustainable.[29] These facts compel the US to seek improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of its organizational structure.

If the USG is to be effective in building and improving interagency capabilities, it must apply its resources in an integrated manner. To achieve integration it is necessary to put organizational structures in place that require the institutional participants to come together for joint planning and program execution. The purpose of integration is to achieve better results in the form of more effective command structure as the totality of US efforts in an integrated strategy is almost certain to be greater than the sum of the individual agencies working separately.

While this is a daunting task, many USG agencies working together can meet this challenge effectively if they pool their efforts and approach the problem in a synergistic way. In many cases, no single USG agency or department has the resources, expertise, or institutional mandate to deal with all of the aspects of countering a national threat. An integrated strategy would combine the efforts of the various USG agency players to accomplish common strategic objectives. An integrated strategy would allow the US to combine its own national efforts with those of our foreign allies and interagency partners to counter global threats. As an example, intelligence cooperation requires, at a minimum, the joint efforts of the Intelligence Community, DoD, and DoS. It is

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29. Amy Belaso, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, (Congressional Research Service, 2009), 2.

unlikely that any single USG agency or department has the resources or expertise to deal with such a complex set of requirements. The USG as whole, working in a unified and synchronized manner, however, almost certainly does.

Chapter 2

Bureaucratic Effects

The current USG structure inhibits unity of command and unity of effort in fighting transnational terrorism. Cultural barriers prevent departments and non-DoD agencies[30] from working synergistically and a lack of common planning perspectives and doctrine further exacerbate USG agencies' dysfunctionality. Additionally, non-DoD agencies reward neither oversees service nor prepare for high-threat environments. Organizational behavior theory reveals most USG agencies' inefficient performance stems from bureaucratic bargaining and decisions made when those agencies were formed. Additionally, power, position, influence, and survival instincts all drive government agencies toward inefficient and sometimes irrational behavior.[31] This section focuses on framing overarching guidelines followed by recommendations for a revised organizational structure.

Framing Guidelines

USG agencies must become more effective in applying the elements of national power to accomplish national security objectives. Various contingencies illustrate a process lacking unity of effort and paralyzed by cultural mismatches within the USG structure. USG agencies strive to maintain their status and power instead of working together to promote

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30. Examples DoS, DoJ
31. Allison, Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 258

synergistic solutions. Proposing reforms involves fundamental changes. Legislation is needed to provide overarching guidelines that dictate how government agencies should perform. Implementing overarching guidelines in an organizational structure enables them to take root and evolve to meet requirements.

Charting a new course to counter the effects of bureaucratic seams begins by reviewing history's lessons. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provides a useful starting point for drafting overarching guidelines necessary to counter bureaucratic seams.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act served as watershed legislation that fundamentally altered DoD by integrating service capabilities into an effective joint war fighting force. Goldwater-Nichols sought to mitigate the "excessive power and influence of the four services" that prevented their successful integration.[32] Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, unity of effort and command suffered as the services maintained considerable independence at the expense of the war-fighting combatant commanders.[33] Chains of command and authority were unclear while roles and responsibilities remained ambiguous because they were never clearly specified in the original National Security Act of 1947.[34] Planning within DoD pre-Goldwater-Nichols was also ineffective. "Contingency plans had limited utility in crises, often because they were not based on

32. James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac*, (Texas A&M Press, 2007), 422.
33. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 25
34. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 35, In this case, the original NSA 1947 did not clearly specified the relationship between the newly formed Secretary of Defense and the three service secretaries—Army, Navy, and Air Force.

valid political assumptions."[35] Finally, there was little incentive for officers to serve in joint assignments. Officers lacked adequate education, experience, and skills to serve effectively in joint assignments, and many times their service cultures drove priorities.[36]

Goldwater-Nichols offered seven solutions to solve these problems:

- To reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority
- To improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense
- To place clear responsibility commanders of specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned those commands
- To ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned those commands
- To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
- To provide for the more efficient use defense resources
- To improve joint officer management policies
- Generally, to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DoD management and administration.[37]

Goldwater-Nichols objectives serve as a useful template for legislative changes that correct whole-of-government problems, and not just problems in DoD. Problems that plagued the military, such as lack of unity of effort and ineffective planning, also plague the government as a whole. The goals of Goldwater-Nichols can define overarching guidelines that enable government agencies to execute policy using the full spectrum of national power, that clearly define chains of command, and that establish an environment where unity of effort and command

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35. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac,* 303
36. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac,* 60
37. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac,* 422

flourish. Based on Goldwater-Nichols, overarching guidelines reforming government agencies are listed below.

Countering Bureaucratic Effects

Countering bureaucratic effects using the Goldwater Nichols template allows the USG to integrate political and military objectives. Translating those objectives into action requires redefining interagency organizational structure, establishing accountability, embedding flexibility, and clearly defining hierarchies.

- Reorganize government agencies to improve the execution capability provided for the President
- Chains of command - Place clear responsibility on a leader to direct action using all the capabilities from all elements of national power for the accomplishment of assigned missions
- Clear Unity of Effort - Ensure the authority of leader is fully commensurate with responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned
- Common procedures and language – Increase attention to strategy formulation, contingency planning, and doctrine development that include application of all elements of national power and applies across USG agencies
- Enhance the effectiveness of operations and improve leadership, management and administration

The most critical of these initiatives is restructuring USG organizations to increase unity of effort and unity of command. Restructuring the USG provides the capability to simultaneously develop and execute policy, the ability to distinguish between policy formation and its execution, and the capacity to better define mission areas and responsibilities.

Restructuring USG organization decreases ambiguity by clearly articulating roles, missions, and responsibilities.[38] Clearly articulating roles and missions requires delineating standardized geographic and functional organizations.[39] It also minimizes duplication of effort and conflicting responsibilities. Standardized geographic groupings mitigate confusion and unnecessarily complex coordination requirements. Standardized functional categorizations streamline processes by providing single focal points with functional expertise.

Improving interagency capability to execute policy also involves USG agencies conducting daily, long range, and crisis operations across the spectrum of strategy, operations, and tactics. Capability to execute policy allows these agencies to employ a variety of decision modes ranging from traditional coordination to real time command and control and also includes the capacity to task organize agency sub-elements. Next, providing flexibility requires establishing defined command and control mechanisms and documented operating procedures that streamline routine actions and facilitate organizational trust and competence.

Finally, improving non-DoD capacity requires establishing an accepted hierarchy of command relationships among various USG departments.[40] Support relationships must be defined to ensure

38. Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,* (Department of Defense, 2006), VI-3.
39. Cohen, *United States Commission on National Security,* 54
40. Joint Publication 1, VI-4

supported and supporting roles are understood.[41] Relationships between

leaders of various geographic or functional mission areas must also be

established to clarify chains of command and support relationships

where potential for functional or geographic responsibilities overlap.

Common procedures and language

Another cause of bureaucratic effects is different common procedures

and language. To counter these effects requires developing a planning

culture, defining a common set of terms, and standardizing procedures

and processes related to policy execution.

The most critical aspect of alleviating cultural barriers is developing a

planning culture. A planning culture enables non-DoD agencies to

anticipate national security challenges, articulate associated US

objectives, develop a strategy to achieve those objectives, and delineate

clear responsibilities for execution of the strategy. A planning culture

aids in organizational learning and contributes to a shared vision.[42]

An institutionalized planning culture provides a framework for actors

across USG agencies to share ideas, gain a mutual understanding of

capabilities and limitations, and bridge cultural divides and stereotypes.[43]

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41. Joint Publication 1, VI-3
42. Some are skeptic of the requirement to plan argue plans rarely execute as written. Others may be disinclined to put down on paper how the U.S. plans to accomplish its objectives fearing diplomatic ramifications should plans be leaked and desiring maximum flexibility to deal with national security situations. However, given the complexity of past operations, the alternative of continuing current ad hoc processes seem pointless as compared to developing a plan from which to IA process participants can deviate during execution and a process that helps to unify effort by providing standard procedures.
43. P. N. Kelleher, *Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military,* (Joint Forces Quarterly, 2002), 104-110

It serves as a critical element for exercising unity of command and unity of effort by recognizing a single leader tasked to accomplish specific missions.[44] It also provides a process to incorporate NGOs. Additionally, it prevents policy-organization-resource mismatches.[45] Finally, it is the venue for drawing on the wealth of experiences from functional and regional experts.[46]

As important as developing the planning process, building common understanding across bureaucratic seams also requires developing standardized doctrine. Doctrine serves as common language that transcends departmental and agency perspectives and unifies action across USG agencies. Doctrine outlines fundamental principles and serves as the authoritative guide. However, it is not dogmatic, does not replace leadership, and requires judgment in application.[47] Finally, doctrine promotes a common perspective and enables effective integration by gathering lessons learned and codifying best practices.

Improve leadership, management and administration.

Unity of effort is further exacerbated by the massive scope of national interests. Given the size of the policymaking task, the USG requires civil service and military professionals with broad experience

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44. Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,* 3
45. In this case, institutionalized imagination can be accomplished by developing "Red Teams" within the formal planning process. The purpose of Red Teams, is to think, act, and operate as the adversary. In thinking as the adversary, they serve to probe standing institutions, find and exploit weaknesses, and help anticipate adversary courses of action.
46. Kelleher, *Interagency Cooperation and the Military,* 109-110.
47. Joint Publication 1, I-8-9.

and depth and knowledge about policy issues. Although the military has codified requirements for interagency coordination in joint doctrine, there is no single entity responsible for managing coordination and providing strategic leadership and direction across the interagency community.

Furthermore, the personnel systems needed to build a cadre of civilian and military professionals are lacking. Michael Thompson writes, "despite ad hoc organizational reforms in recent years, nothing in Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom would suggest that DoD's Combatant Commands are equipped, organizationally or culturally, to handle these interagency challenges."[48] The interagency process, especially when military planners are involved throughout will increase effectiveness.[49] The lack of trained and experienced interagency professionals significantly diminishes efforts to combat terrorism.

The single pillar that facilitates each of the other objectives involves building mutual understanding and trust within USG agencies. Trust among departments and agencies are key to increasing effectiveness in countering transnational threats. Breaking down cultural barriers and false perceptions facilitates effective methods for dealing with national security challenges such as transnational terror. At its core, building mutual trust and credibility begins with instilling a view that individuals from various agencies possess the competence to perform their tasks and

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48. Michael J. Thompson, *Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power,* (Parameters Winter 2005), 5.
49. Thompson, *Breaking the Proconsulate,* 6.

desire to achieve interagency solutions.[50] Once individual credibility is established, trust expands to include parent agencies that are a critical requirement necessary to mitigate organizational survival instincts. Building a cultural bias for DoD solutions promotes confidence, interdependence, and develops a shared appreciation for the requirements of government agencies.[51] The benefit is combined understanding of interagency culture that allows a holistic effort to counter our nation's threats.

Achieving a cultural bias for DoD solutions is accomplished through education, training, and interagency service. Education and training builds a cadre of professionals familiar with both their parent and other department capabilities. Exercises and simulations provide venues to share experiences and break down cultural barriers. Finally, incentives provide a means for career progression without threatening existing bureaucratic organizational survival.

Building a cultural bias for DoD solutions relies heavily on education and training. Scott Moore states in his Joint Force Quarterly article, "Today its Gold, Not Purple," "People achieve interagency unity. If people matter most, invest in them."[52] Training and education are a critical requirement to implement. It begins by supplementing competence in core skills with a mindset that these skills operate best when integrated

50. L.B. Wilkerson, *What Exactly is Jointness?,* (Joint Forces Quarterly Summer, 1997), 66-68.
51. Joint Publication 1, VI-3
52. S.W. Moore, *Today It's Gold, Not Purple*, (Joint Forces Quarterly Winter, 1999), 105.

in interagency solutions. Building this mindset involves education and training curricula that emphasize understanding of other departments and agencies capabilities, limitations, and methods of operation.

With the proper mindset established, focus expands to mid-level education and training. The DoD refers to this as the operational level. Operational training and education is dual focused. First, it will train skills necessary to operate in government agencies. Specifically, operational level training will concentrate on integrated planning processes outlined previously. Second, it will teach operational art--the art of translating national objectives into tactical action. Using joint doctrine as a benchmark to explain the need for combined solutions, Joint Publication 3.0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," operational art is "the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles."[53] Understanding how strategic objectives link to tactical action is a critical linchpin to countering bureaucratic effects and a point of departure in understanding combined solutions for successful USG operations.

Along with training and education, readiness exercise programs are also a critical element in developing a bias toward DoD solutions. Exercises provide opportunities to train standard operating procedures, forge bonds, simulate organizational pressures, and provide experiences

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53. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Department of Defense, Vol.. 14), 4

upon which interagency partners can build. They also provide a forum to forge trust and confidence and long lasting working relationships while helping instill practical lessons that education and training do not provide. "The more people work together, the more confidence they gain in each other, and the greater their efforts to maintain bonds and reputations." [54] In turn, shared experiences build working relationships that underpin subsequent initiatives. Exercise programs require dedicated resources to build realistic multi-agency scenarios that encourage interaction amongst USG agencies.

It also important to note that programs designed to invest in non-DoD partners must also directly target their leaders. Policymakers, statesmen, and military commanders greatly affect the nation's bureaucratic seams. Senior leaders are also more bureaucratically entrenched. Therefore, breaking down cultural barriers also requires education, training, and readiness exercises to enable an appreciation of participant capabilities, and allow them to work past personal biases. Training and exercises help senior leaders to understand the impact of their decisions and provide an arena to gain trust and confidence in other senior leaders. [55]

The final area vital to changing the cultural bias toward USG solutions is personnel management. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated that promotion to high rank required some period of duty with

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54. Moore, *Today It's Gold*, 104
55. Moore, *Today It's Gold*, 105

a joint command. This decision had the strong and immediate effects of loosening the loyalties of senior officers to their separate services and causing them to think more broadly about the military establishment as a whole.[56] Although establishing a joint duty career specialty went a long way in resolving the inadequacies of the National Security Act, complimentary work in the civilian sector has been insufficiently addressed.

Similar to the DoD's Joint Staff prior to implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, there is little incentive for interagency service. A 1985 senate report entitled *"Defense Organization: The Need for Change"*, stated that "military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty...are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs."[57] Like current non-DoD agencies, rewards, accolades, and progression in DoD prior to Goldwater-Nichols were products of parent agencies or departments. For USG agencies to develop integrated inter-departmental solutions require a personnel system that provides promotions and assignments that reward interagency participation.

One attractive alternative advocated by the Commission for National Security/21st Century or Hart-Rudman Commission is the creation of interagency professionals. Under this concept, interagency professionals

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56. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report*,(Washington DC, 2004), 86
57. U.S. Congress, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, (Committee on Armed Services report, 1985), 6

would be provided opportunities to gain experience within various departments through a specialized assignment and promotion system. After firmly establishing basic skills in their chosen field, interagency professionals would be assigned key positions in various departments or agencies without penalty. To provide incentive for service, key senior positions across the agencies and departments would require at least on past assignment as a non-DoD professional.[58]

Additional lessons can be drawn from the Goldwater-Nichols experience. The requirement for increased joint assignments provided military officers improved understanding of sister services. The Act went further to establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty to provide an opportunity to develop a small cadre of military officers who had demonstrated abilities for, and an interest in, joint duty.[59] Likewise, non-DoD agencies could also establish a career specialty to develop a cadre of civilian and military professionals who are trained to work throughout USG agencies. These new interagency personnel would be required to return to their parent organizations periodically to ensure they do not become isolated, and thereby maintain a certain degree of organizational identity. Additionally, education and training initiatives will provide a process to develop a professional interagency cadre and inculcate the value of interagency experience throughout the department.

58. Cohen, *United States Commission on National Security*, 102-103
59. Clark A. Murdock and Richard W. Weitz, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: New Proposals for Defense Reform,* (Joint Force Quarterly Fall 2005), 227.

Finally, it is critical the USG have trained civilian and military professionals experienced in dealing with other agencies. Similar to the actions taken by Goldwater-Nichols to reward joint duty, civilian and military personnel systems could also reward interagency experience. The service chiefs brought relatively limited joint experience to joint staff positions.[60] Therefore, Goldwater-Nichols required joint experience as a prerequisite for promotion to flag or general officer. In the same way, the civilian personnel system could require personnel to serve in designated positions, and require interagency experience as a prerequisite for promotion to Senior Executive Service.

60. National Defense University, *Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,* (National Defense University Library, 2005), 223

Chapter 3

Options and Solutions

This section presents three organizational reform options that would enable unity of command and unity of effort, bridge cultural divides, establish doctrine and procedures, and provide institutional incentives for USG agencies. It begins by providing an overview of each option, and then assesses and compares each option. The three organizational construct options are:

- Option 1 – Regional Unified Focus. Implement a regional Interagency Task Forces (IATF)
- Option 2 – DoD Standing Joint Special Operations Task Force. This option establishes a DoD option for a more effective command and control network using a Standing Joint Force Headquarters concept.
- Option 3 – Standing Interagency HQ. This option establishes a standing Interagency HQ (IAHQ) with the responsibility to conduct full time planning and with the capability to stand-up ad hoc IATFs as situations require.

These options are conceived with a DoD bias. These options use DoD culture as a benchmark for wider government solutions and do not claim to be utopian answers to USG organizational problems. The goal is only to improve integration of strategy amongst USG agencies by synergistically applying all instruments of national power through improved structure. In and of themselves, these options require additional refinement and development encompassing input from all interagency participants. Various levels of analysis may reveal better

ways to reform USG agencies. However, at a minimum, they serve as the
starting point from which USG agencies can debate and implement
reforms.

Option 1 – Regional Unified Focus

Option 1 involves developing an Interagency Task Force (IATF),
possessing command authority to plan and execute regional operations.
Its authority would be modeled on that of a military geographic
combatant command (GCC). See figure 1.

A GCC is organized on a geographical basis known as "Area of
Responsibility." A four star general heads each combatant command
and is selected by the Secretary of Defense and President and confirmed
by Congress. The chain of command runs from the President to the
Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders of the Geographic
Combatant Commands.

Figure 1. Geographic Combatant Commands
Source: Joint Forces Command

IATF Organization.

IATF's would organize along geographic lines using the DoD's GCC geographic boundaries seen in Figure 1. Functionally, IATFs would divide along broad and continuing mission areas that transcend regional boundaries to better pursue terror suspects. For example, these regional IATFs might organize around counter-terrorism, humanitarian operations, or whatever the threat while geographic organizations might mirror DoD's Geographic Combatant Commands.


Figure 2. Interagency Task Force Organization
Source: Author's origional work

Internal to the IATF, the IATF staff would include teams specializing in the diplomatic, military, informational, and economic instruments of power. A representative from an appropriate agency would lead each component and report directly to the IATF leader. For example, the military domain would be led by the corresponding GCC. Supporting the IATF leader would be a staff resourced from various

agencies that provides operations, intelligence, logistics, and plans functions. IATF leaders report directly to the National Security Advisor and rotate between various departments and agencies. The NSC staff would function as a committee with the NSC advisor as the primary arbitrator. The advisor would prioritize decisions for the President when consensus does not exist.

Policy development.

Implementing this option requires a top-down approach driven by the President. Overall responsibility for policy development rests with the National Security Advisor and NSC staff.[61] Additionally, the National Security Planning Directive (NSPD) "assigns specific roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies." The National Security Advisor maintains the primary policy coordination role using the existing principals committees, deputies committees and NSC staff. In addition to policy development, the NSC staff is responsible for developing a NSPD.[62] Once completed, the NSPD serves as strategic guidance for IATFs. The NSPD tasks various IATFs with missions and requires development of plans to accomplish those missions.

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61. Defense Science Board, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, (Department of Defense, 2004) 17.
62. The duties and responsibilities of the actors in the interagency, as outlined in National Security Presidential Directive-1 NSPD, "Organization of the National Security Council System" are to "coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies" Current NSC process refers to the NSC, principles committees, deputies committees, configuration as supported by the NSC Staff. The White House. *Organization of the National Security Council System*. (National Security Council), 1

Command relationships.

To ensure unity of command and effort, IATF leaders possess operational control over each component instrument of power and are responsible for combining those capabilities to accomplish national security objectives in their regions as depicted in figure 3.


Figure 3. Stove piped vs Integrated focus
Source: Author's origional work

The NSPD would establish command relationships and planning requirements for the NSC, agencies, and IATFs. Additionally, it also outlines support relationships and liaison requirements across bureaucratic seams in the form of IATFs.

Policy Execution.

The IATF and its subordinate component instruments of power provide the mechanism for policy execution. IATFs direct actions in their regions. They are accountable to the National Security Advisor and the

President for directing efforts across the USG agencies to develop, exercise, and execute plans and operations tasked by the NSPD.

Adopting the IATF option requires radical rethinking of foreign policy. The NSC would organize around two branches--policy development and policy execution. The focus for the policy development branch is to coordinate policies through the current interagency process and produce the NSPD. The Policy Execution Branch is a staff structure supporting and coordinating efforts across each of the IATFs.

Several potential advantages occur by employing an IATF construct. The first advantage is increased simplicity and clarity. This is achieved by placing one geographic IATF in charge with the span of control and authority to direct operations. This organization simplifies and clarifies chains of command, command relationships, and other organizational arrangements. Employing an IATF also consolidates various planning efforts and forces lower-level cooperation. The IATF also increases unity of command by placing a single leader in a position with the authority and accountability to synergistically plan and execute post-conflict operations.

If this option were adopted, the IATF would improve interagency operations in two ways. First, publishing an NSPD would provide a playbook that clarifies strategic guidance and establishes command relationships necessary to plan and execute non-DoD operations. Secondly, the IATF would provide continuity between administrations by

establishing a standing execution structure for non-DoD operations--one that only currently exists within the NSC.

There are several tradeoffs and costs associated with the IATF option. First, using an IATF may over-centralize power in the NSC. Under this option, the NSC maintains primary control over all aspects of policy formation and execution. Control over policy formation is a result of the requirement for the NSC to write the NSPD. Additionally, the NSC also would possess immense control over policy execution because it would control IATF mandates and resources. This would come at the expense of department and agency autonomy. Implementing IATFs requires powerful departments and agencies to subordinate their interests to IATFs. For example, DoD's geographic combatant commands would support the corresponding IATF rather than reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. This is counter to the National Security Act of 1947 originally establishing the DoD, SECAF, and GCCs. Though a primary goal of the IATF is to push interagency cooperation to a lower level, a committee between the GCC and the President could slow military decision-making. Likewise, ambassadors would report to the IATF. This would be a dramatic break with the past, but today's SECDEF and ambassadorial power could be archaic based on today's threats. Stovepipe structures with departmental focus are obsolete because of evolving threats and globalized communication.

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A second cost of this option is the requirement placed on the IATF's leaders. The IATF leader is responsible for understanding the capabilities of various departments, knowledge of planning processes, and requirements of their geographic or functional area. For example, if an IATF had been in place for OIF post-conflict operations, the IATF leader would have had to understand military operations, diplomatic agreements, cultural nuances, and inter-workings of government agencies bureaucracy. Comparatively, while the Geographic Combatant Commander requires working knowledge of each of the previously mentioned areas, his primary arena, military operations, is his focus.

A third cost is the requirement to adopt a DoD planning culture within IATF to implement the option. IATFs require understanding of planning that is currently not present. It requires the IATF to adopt disciplined planning processes in order to produce the NSPD. Along with the requirement to adopt a DoD planning culture, IATFs also affect the organizational culture by requiring a higher order of organizational discipline inherent in executing deliberate planning. Additionally, this option leaves unmitigated cultural or organizational barriers present in the current interagency process.

Option 2 - - Global Counter Terrorism

This option focuses on a single department, the DoD, and more specifically USSOCOM, as the lead agent for the overseas portion of the GWOT. Because terrorists cross GCC boundaries, USSOCOM will

require a new organization modeled on the Standing Joint Force

Headquarters (SJFHQ), and it will reform the Theater Special Operations

Commands (TSOC).[63] The transformation proposed here will use the

SJFHQ model applied to a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)

structured under USSOCOM or the TSOC.[64] This task force would be

capable of combined operations across the entire spectrum of warfare

from pre-crisis activities to major force engagements. USSOCOM would

plan and execute operations rather than just provide trained forces to

GCCs.[65]

Figure 4. How a SJFHQ would look
Source: Author's origional work

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63. TSOCs are the nucleus around which a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) can be structured. They provide a clear chain of command for in-theater SOF as well as the staff expertise to plan, conduct, and support joint SO in the theater's area of responsibility.
64.   A supported commander is the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander is the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander.

The SJFHQ would be a team of SOF planners and command and control specialists.[66] The SJFHQ would augment the JFC's staff within a combatant command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This team of experts develops a working relationship with other commands, government agencies, and coalition partners.

Each geographic combatant command already has a TSOC just as it has a ground, air, and naval component commander. The TSOC is a sub-unified command of the geographic combatant command and the source of expertise in all areas of special operations. The TSOC provides the geographic combatant commander with a separate element to plan and control joint SOF in his or her theater. The commander of the TSOC is responsible for commanding all SOF in the theater to which the TSOC is assigned.

Standing Joint Special Operations Task Force (SJSOTF) Organization

USSOCOM either can support the SJSOTF or be supported by the SJSOTF. Organizing the SJSOTF headquarters under USSOCOM provides the optimal solution. This arrangement would fall within USSOCOM's current mission statement: "USSOCOM plans, directs, and executes special operations in the conduct of the War on Terror in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist networks that threaten the

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65. United States Joint Forces Command, *Standing Joint Force Headquarters*, (jfcom.mil, 2008), 1

United States, its citizens and interests worldwide. USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips Special Operations Forces provided to Geographic Combatant Commanders, American ambassadors, and their country teams."[67]


Figure 5. USSOCOM as <u>Supported</u> Command
Source: Author's origional work

Assigning the SJSOTF headquarters under USSOCOM would not limit the ability of TSOC's to conduct operations within their specific areas of responsibility; rather, the SJSOTF's organizational placement gives policy makers and SOF commanders an expanded array of options and a more flexible system of command and control. In 2005, USSOCOM reorganized its headquarters by establishing the Center for Special Operations (CSO) to fulfill its new charter as a supported

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66. USSOCOM, *USSOCOM Posture Statement*, (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM History and Research Office, 2008), 4

command.[68] The CSO coordinates global operations and actionable intelligence, particularly against high value targets. Previous directorates for operations, plans and policy, and intelligence and information operations, have been consolidated into the CSO under three groups: the Intelligence Support Group (J2), the Operations Support Group (J3), and the Campaign Support Group (J5). As seen in figure 5, the SJSOTF addition would therefore become the operational arm of the CSO, allowing for centralized planning and decentralized execution of special operations on a global scale in support of the war on terrorism. Specified Army SOF (ARSOF), Navy SOF (NAVSOF), Air Force SOF (AFSOF), and supporting conventional units would be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the SJSOTF headquarters for the duration of the mission.

Additionally, U.S. law already allows assigning the SJSOTF to USSOCOM. Specifically, Title 10, section 167(d)(i) states, "Unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted." Section 167(d)(i) further provides, "The commander of the special operations command shall exercise command if directed to do so by the President or Secretary of

67. USSOCO, *Posture Statement,* 13

Defense."[69] The way is clear for USSOCOM organize more effectively. Assigning the SJSOTF headquarters to USSOCOM would represent a tangible step towards that goal.

When the SECDEF requires USSOCOM to resume a supporting role, the SJSOTF headquarters could be placed under operational control of a GCC, JTF, or Joint Force Command (JFC). There, the SJSOTF headquarters could serve as a JSOTF under the theater JSOCC, or fulfill the role of a JSOCC alongside its Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC), Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC), and Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) counterparts. USSOCOM would retain administrative control of the SJSOTF headquarters; additionally, the SJSOTF headquarters could leverage intelligence, resources, and other capabilities of the Center for Special Operations while still under the operational control (OPCON) of a JFC.[70]

Imbedding the standing JSOTF headquarters in the TSOC could provide the most effective transition from the peacetime regional security and cooperation operations of a TSOC to its wartime role as the SOF component command. Positioning the SJSOTF headquarters with the TSOCs would yield some significant advantages, particularly in terms of

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68. United States Congress, *Report to Congress on Changing Roles of the United States Special Operations Command,* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004), 8.
69. The *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms* defines administrative control, or ADCON, as " direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations."

regional orientation. The SJSOTF commander and staff would work with the TSOC staff on a daily basis, becoming intimately involved and attuned to the operational environment of a region.


Figure 6. USSOCOM as a <u>Supporting</u> Command
Source: Author's origional work

This option has risks. The TSOC commander could immerse a SJSOTF headquarters in theater engagement tasks such as planning Joint and Combined Exercises for Training (JCET) or a myriad of other tasks. The TSOCs' historical manning shortfalls increase this concern. According to a 1996 wartime requirements study conducted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/ Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/ LIC), TSOC peacetime manning meets only 39% to 63% of its wartime requirement.[71] Given this continued personnel shortage, a TSOC commander is hard pressed to protect the SJSOTF headquarters

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70. USSOCOM, *USSOCOM History,* (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM History and Research Office), 3

from the TSOC's daily work requirements and from becoming merely a staff supplement. In effect, the SJSOTF headquarters assigned to a TSOC would experience essentially the same friction its ad hoc brethren do upon crisis initiation since time needed for staff training during pre-crisis activities might be squandered.

Additionally, personnel shortfalls throughout the SOF community would today preclude the assignment of SJSOTFs to the TSOC's. As the ASD SO/LIC study indicates, TSOC's are historically undermanned with qualified personnel. Fifty percent of the personnel currently serving on TSOC staffs have no prior SOF experience; the DoD personnel system has not produced enough qualified SOF officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCO's) to fill these billets.[72]

Instead, conventional service members from all services end up filling this gap, often requiring significant training to become adept staff officers in a SOF headquarters. The addition of an SJSOTF headquarters to each TSOC would further dilute the SOF background of the TSOC staff, for experienced special operators would most likely be pulled from their duties to fill key positions in the deployable command structure.

A standing headquarters with a global focus offers flexibility. For example, one plausible scenario might include USSOCOM as a supported command, employing the SJSOTF to conduct advanced force operations (AFO) or other GWOT activities in a region as directed by the President or

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71. USSOCOM, *USSOCOM History*, 20

Secretary of Defense.[73] While technically serving as the "supporting"

command, the GCC of the region would actually benefit because of the

resources provided by USSOCOM. Other than providing the required

support for the SJSOTF, the GCC, along with its TSOC, would be free to

conduct operations in other parts of its AOR. Likewise, USSOCOM could

shift to a supporting command, transferring OPCON of the SJSOTF to

the GCC. The SJSOTF, having already conducted numerous operations

in the AOR, would transition to the control of the GCC's JTF or JFC; in

fact, the SOF element, with its longevity and enhanced situational

awareness, would most likely play a significant role in the reception,

staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of other forces into

theater. This is but one of the many command and control permutations

offered by the SJSOTF headquarters acting in concert with USSOCOM's

Title 10 responsibilities.

Option 3 - - Standing Interagency Headquarters (IAHQ)

This option creates a full time IAHQ with the responsibility to

conduct planning and to stand-up Sub-IATFs. This option builds on the

work of the SJFHQ Model described above.

IAHQ Organization.

Within this option, the NSC staffs and organizes a full time IAHQ

with representatives from each of the four elements of power--diplomatic,

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72. Secretary of Defense approved military operations such as clandestine operations, source operations, and deployment of enabling forces and capabilities to conduct target specific preparations prior to the conduct of actual operations.

informational, military, and economic. As seen in figure 7, the structure of the proposed IAHQ is similar to the SJFHQ construct posed in option two. The IAHQ is organized around geographic and functional IATFs as seen in figure 2.


Figure 7. Interagency Headquarters Organization
Source: Author's origional work

The IAHQ has the capability to deploy Sub Interagency Task Forces (Sub-IATF). Sub-IATFs provide the capability to respond to emerging situations. They are organized to accomplish missions in specific geographic areas or for specific functional contingencies, and they operate by melding capabilities from across agencies. Once established, they serve as the focal point for operations. They maintain operational

control and command authority over forces and operations within their mission area. This operational control includes planning, exercise, and execution of operations.[74]

Policy development.

The President drives the policy development process. However, using an IAHQ construct, the IAHQ assumes responsibility for the National Security Planning Directive (NSPD) and supporting plan development. Additionally, the NSC and its staff maintain oversight of the plan approval process.

Command relationships

The IAHQ would report directly to the National Security Advisor and the President. They also have operational control over departments and agencies necessary to conduct planning and exercises. Where necessary, the IAHQ leader has the authority to delegate operational control to Sub-IATF leaders of other departments and agencies. The NSC, NSC staff, and other departments and agencies serve in advisory roles to the IAHQ and Sub-IATF. Other support relationships with departments and agencies are included in the NSPD.

Policy Execution.

Under this option, IAHQ's primary task is developing and exercising strategic plans. The IAHQ would develop objectives and strategic plans that would be exercised, tested, and supported by more detailed

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73. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* II-14

component plans prepared by organizations such as the geographic combatant commanders. The strategic plans serve as a foundation for departments and agencies to develop more detailed supporting diplomatic, information, military, and economic plans.

Plan execution rests with either a Sub-IATF, lead agency, or the IAHQ. The determination of executing authority depends upon the scope, scale, and duration of the operation. Operations involving a shorter duration would be maintained by the current lead agency execution construct. For larger operations involving a number of departments or agencies and having a potential for long-term engagement, Sub-IATFs would likely execute interagency plans. For operations requiring a significant effort from a number of departments or agencies, the IAHQ assumes responsibility for executing operations. In any of the mentioned alternatives, operational control is delegated to the appropriate leader.

The IAHQ option offers several advantages. Chief among the advantages is increased unity of effort at the strategic level. The IAHQ aids unity of effort by centralizing all government efforts around one organization with the primary task of planning and executing operations. The IAHQ also provides the framework to integrate planning and execution. One planning process leads to a single strategic plan.

A second advantage of the IAHQ option is increased flexibility by forming Sub-IATFs. Sub-IATFs enable the IAHQ the flexibility to

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establish organizations based on operational missions requiring integration of various elements of national power. For example, in Iraq, Security, Stabilization, and Institution Building Sub-IATFs could have been used to organize operational missions (see Figure 8). Under this construct, a Sub-IATF named "Security" assumes responsibility for establishing security functions to include "separating factions and beginning the repair of vital infrastructure."[75] While "Sub-IATF Security" accomplishes the security mission, "Sub-IATF Stabilization" continues infrastructure repair, strives to include civilian and NGO bodies, and facilitates full transition to Iraqi control. Along with security and stabilization, "Sub-IATF Infrastructure" focuses on long-term nation state requirements to include economic investment, education, and electoral tasks.[76]


Figure 8. Sub-IATF Example
Source: Author's origional work

74. Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 43
75. Crane, Terril, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 43-54

Several tradeoffs emerge with the IAHQ option. Most importantly, Sub-IATFs do little to build relationships or bridge operational or tactical level barriers. For example, if employed in OIF post-conflict case, Sub-IATFs would not have provided the time for agencies to form working relationships and address required interoperability requirements. Even if Sub-IATFs were formed 6-12 months prior to execution, regional understanding and working relationships require years of focus. Additionally, the training and exercise requirements required to build high functioning organizations are also lacking in a Sub-IATF construct. Finally, a series of Sub-IATFs increases coordination requirements and potentially complicates unity of command and unity of effort.

Chapter 4

Conclusion

The aim of proposed reforms is to counter negative bureaucratic effects with improved execution capability, unity of command, unity of effort, common procedures and language, and by bridging organizational cultures. Each option has strengths and weaknesses.

Acceptable/ Feasible

All three options are feasible; however option 3 (IAHQ) fares best. Though option 2, the DoD internal solution provides flexibility, personnel shortfalls throughout the SOF community would preclude the assignment of an SJSOTF to the TSOC's. However, option 3 only requires limited augmentation of personnel contained in the current NSC and USG agencies. Comparatively, option 1 (IATF) potentially requires significant additional personnel, infrastructure, material, and funding to form various regional and functional commands. Finally, the option 1 must overcome cultural bias necessary for the IATFs to implement a sound planning culture.

Unity of effort

All three options improve unity of effort. However, the IATF option provides the most holistic USG approach to counter terrorism. The IATF option provides a focused organization fully engaged in accomplishing missions assigned in an area of interest. The IATF option also singularly focuses around interagency operations. Though the DoD approach binds

seams internally, the DoD option is a weaker solution because its agency-centered approach does not bind USG seams. Finally, the IAHQ option brings together elements of power under one organization; however, it relies on ad-hoc Sub-IATFs. The reliance on ad-hoc organizations may not allow organizations to continually work together and build relationships necessary to execute complex national security operations.

Unity of command

The IATF option improves unity of command better than either the IAHQ or the DoD options. Again, the IATFs functionally or regionally based organizations provide a venue for all the elements of power to work together on a continual basis. However, the IATF option might meet institutional resistance to placing departmental assets under the direct control outside of the parent agency. Additionally, it may complicate unity of command for DoD's geographic combatant commands during the execution of major conflict operations. Finally, the IAHQ option increases unity of command at the strategic level. However, operationally, unity of command is reduced by reliance on ad-hoc IATFs.

Organizational and Cultural Barriers

The IATF and IAHQ options are best at overcoming organizational and cultural barriers. Both options orient the operating staff full time against a singular national security task. Comparatively, with its

agency-centered focus, the DoD model fares worst at breaking down cultural barriers amongst other interagency partners.

Recommendation

The recommended option is a hybrid of various organizational reform courses of action presented so far. The recommended organizational structure involves forming a standing IAHQ from option 3 supported by regional IATFs of option 1. Within this model, the IAHQ serves as the overall organization providing policy, guidance, and oversight for actions of regional and functional IATFs. The IAHQ also assumes primary responsibility for drafting the NSPD. In turn, IATFs serve as the regional or functional experts that use assigned capabilities from across the USG to develop and execute plans for tasked by the NSPD.

Adopting a hybrid organization alleviates the disadvantages of employing ad-hoc Sub-IATFs. It also provides a standing capability necessary to establish regional partnerships and inter-departmental working relationships. Additionally, employing a standing IAHQ provides a full time organization focused entirely on executing and integrating interagency operations across each of the various IATFs. Finally, employing IATFs in conjunction with IAHQ provides maximum flexibility to tailor responses to various regional or functional contingency requirements.

Reforming USG agencies requires bold measures. First, reform begins by establishing clear guidelines and core operating principles to

correct shortfalls and provide guidance for continued improvement. Lessons learned from the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 are applicable in countering bureaucratic effects and binding unity of command and unity of effort.

These lessons guide the vision for how USG agencies should operate and provide the seeds of change. These lessons also build upon previous large-scale bureaucratic restructuring and seek to correct fundamental problems within the current process. Incorporation of these guidelines is no small task. It requires significant advocacy from champions in both the executive and legislative branches. Without such support, little reform is likely because the existing bureaucracy will fight fundamental change.

Bold legislative reforms restructure national security organizations. Steps must be taken to reform USG agencies to provide the framework for national security organizations to evolve and grow. The country would benefit from an organizational model that forms a standing IAHQ supported by regional and functional IATFs that plan, exercise, and execute national security policy directives. At the strategic level, the IAHQ would serve as the umbrella organization that drives all aspects of non-DoD operations. The IAHQ serves as the focal point for developing operational guidance and defining command relationships. In turn, the IATFs would be the operational and tactical executors. IATFs regional

and functional focus combined with unambiguous command relationships, would allow for coherent implementation of national policy.

These reforms require additional refinement and development. Various levels of analysis may reveal better ways to reform USG agencies. However, at a minimum, they serve as a starting point from which experts can debate and implement reforms. Further study is required to address methods that overcome organizational resistance to change that will arise when departmental "turf" is invaded.

Some may argue the cost of implementing such drastic changes would exceed the benefit. This is open to investigation. However, the system already imposes significant tangible and intangible costs. Some of these costs come in the form of policy that results in diplomatic failures and military disasters.[77] Costs also arise when the USG tasks agencies not suited to their tasks.[78] The results are often achieved at an unnecessarily high price.

USG agencies also draw on the President's and other senior official's time and political capital as they operate inefficiently to draft and execute policy.[79] There are lost opportunities and inefficiency when the USG poorly synchronizes its strategy.[80] Opportunity costs also occur when the focus within the USG is on developing relationships versus actions--an outcome in large measure resulting from an inability to maintain

76. Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC,* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 229
77. Zegart, *Flawed by Design,* 229
78. Zegart, *Flawed by Design,* 229-231
79. Kelleher, *Crossing Boundaries,* 108

coherent organizations and ad hoc organizational relationships and procedures.[81]

Finally, maintaining the status quo will perpetuate high costs and potential operational failings during critical periods during transition between peace and conflict operations. It will also likely hinder most of the fruitful efforts to incorporate the speed and agility available from information-based processes.[82]

As Allison's models point out, organizations will behave in a manner that is fitting with their interests, stakes, motivations, and power. It is difficult to fathom an organization internally rewarding and promoting those representatives that criticize the organization's mission, parochial priorities, or patterns of behavior. This means that an organization's representatives will be reluctant to venture outside of what is expected in terms of keeping the organization's interests primarily when coordinating with other agencies.

USG agencies are important to the implementation of strategy abroad and require organizational change to lessen dysfunction and build well-designed relationships. Congressional legislation is the most viable means toward solving the number of problems found in interagency cooperation. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act is a model for such legislation. It demonstrates how to bring organizations that possess different interests, capabilities, and strong cultural beliefs together so

80. Kelleher, *Crossing Boundaries*, 109
81. David D. Tucker, *The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?,* (Parameters, 2000), 2

that future threats are dealt with a synergism missing from our current construct.

Any future remedy must be driven by a holistic government solution that would move toward greater function and efficiency. Until this occurs, USG agencies will continue to be fraught with difficulties, and unity of effort to defend against transnational terror networks will remain elusive.

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